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Issues of risk are, understandably, receiving a lot of attention in the debate
over the relative merits of investment-based (IB) and pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) social security systems. The risks to retirement income associ-
ated with IB systems are well known and at least partly oﬀset the attrac-
tiveness of their higher expected returns relative to a PAYGO system.1 Yet
PAYGO systems are not free from risk either. An important source of risk
associated with these more traditional social security systems is commonly
referred to as political risk—deﬁned here to be the risk that beneﬁt rules
will be changed through the political process before or during one’s retire-
ment, thereby changing the value of retirement beneﬁts. For the United
States, evidence that people perceive such a risk comes from opinion sur-
veys that show low conﬁdence in the ability of social security to pay the
beneﬁts due under current rules, although those surveyed do expect to
receive some beneﬁts (see Reno and Friedland 1997).2 It is also interesting
to note how the reform debate has been framed in terms of “saving social
security,” especially after President Clinton’s 1998 State of the Union ad-
dress, which had saving the program as its centerpiece. In part, this is an
attempt to make use of the risks people perceive in terms of the sus-
tainability of current rules to spur reform.
Under the social security beneﬁt rules for current retirees, the share of
state-funded pension expenditures in GDP is set to rise as populations in
John McHale is associate professor of economics at Harvard University.
1. For diﬀerent perspectives on how risk aﬀects the attractiveness of IB systems, see Gea-
nakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998) and Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998).
2. Interestingly, although respondents claimed to have little conﬁdence in social security,
they still expressed strong support for the program.
247the major industrial economies become older.3 Population aging is most
pronounced for Germany and Italy, where it is projected that there will be
one person over sixty-ﬁve for every two people of working age by 2030,
compared to roughly one for four at present. If current high levels of pen-
sion generosity are maintained, old-age cash beneﬁts must grow to ac-
count for almost one-quarter of GDP in both countries.4 In the other G7
countries, where projected aging is not as pronounced and/or current pen-
sion beneﬁts are less generous, projected GDP shares are lower, although
the increases are still considerable in some cases. These projections of
more costly state pension programs have led to concerns about increased
labor market distortions (including higher unemployment), inadequate
national saving, and declining returns on contributions for future genera-
tions of workers. Another possibility, however, is that greater costliness
under current rules will lead to changes to those rules and, unless replace-
ment provision is made, inadequate retirement incomes for current work-
ers. Indeed, rule changes that reduce future beneﬁts are not just something
that might happen in the future. A number of countries, including Ger-
many and Italy, have already responded by legislating downward adjust-
ments to future beneﬁt generosity.
While reasonably easy to describe, political risk of this kind is hard to
quantify. The problem is similar to the problem of estimating credit (or
default) risk on ﬁxed-income assets; history is a poor guide to the proba-
bilities and sizes of infrequent discrete adjustments. Nonetheless, given the
importance of political risk to economic comparisons of risky retirement-
income systems and to an understanding of the political economy of re-
form, it is important to have at least a sense of what these risks are.5
This paper takes a small step in assessing political risk. To see what can
be learned about the eﬀect on future beneﬁts of the type of beneﬁt reforms
that have been pursued in recent years, I examine redeﬁnitions of PAYGO
beneﬁt rules in the G7 countries from the mid-1980s through the mid-
1990s. Until recent decades, rule changes tended to make systems more
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3. Population aging will become pronounced after about 2010 because of the retirement of
the post-World War II baby-boom generation and the fall in fertility rates in recent decades.
Populations are also aging because of increased longevity.
4. Generosity is deﬁned here as the ratio of the average beneﬁt per elderly person to GDP
per working-age person. I elaborate on this in sec. 7.1 below.
5. A common measure of the return (or money’s worth) on PAYGO contributions is the
ratio of the present discounted value of beneﬁts to the present discounted value of contribu-
tions (see Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes 1998). From the perspective of a worker at a
particular point in time, there are a number of factors that make this return uncertain. The
worker does not know with certainty his or her subsequent earnings proﬁle, date of retire-
ment, tax rates, length of life, rules for deﬁning beneﬁts, and so on. For this paper, I concen-
trate on the numerator of this return measure—the present discounted value of the stream
of beneﬁts. Moreover, to focus on the eﬀects of changes in beneﬁt rules, I assume ﬁxed
expectations for the earnings proﬁle, retirement date, and length of life. The extent of this
political risk depends, then, on the eﬀect of various discrete rule changes on the stream of
beneﬁts and the probabilities of those changes.generous rather than less. This was possible because favorable demograph-
ics (as baby-boom generations entered the labor force) and the immaturity
of earnings-related pension systems made obligations under existing rules
easily aﬀordable.6 Now that rapid population aging is on the horizon and
most systems are mature, reform eﬀorts are aimed at curtailing program
costs. Recent rule changes have included increases in retirement ages (es-
pecially for women), changing the way postretirement beneﬁts are in-
dexed, and increasing the number of years of earnings included in the
calculation of the initial beneﬁt.7 To gauge the eﬀect of these reforms, my
approach is to estimate the change in the present discounted value of the
beneﬁts an “average” household can expect to receive—or gross social
security wealth (SSW)—as a result of a reform.
The results from this small sample show that beneﬁt-rule changes that
substantially reduce SSW are not unusual responses to projections of
sharply rising costs ﬁfteen to thirty years into the future. In some cases,
the reforms do reduce the SSW of workers who are already at retirement
age, although the sizes of the reductions are typically small. More often,
however, the reforms are phased in so that their main burden does not fall
on the currently retired or those close to retirement. Young and middle-
aged workers appear to be willing to accept large reductions in their gross
social security wealth while protecting the currently old. Assuming that
the reforms are fully phased in by the time the worker retires, reductions
in SSW of between one-quarter and one-third have not been uncommon.
For middle-aged workers, this almost certainly means a loss of net social
security wealth as well since they are unlikely to beneﬁt to a great extent
from resulting lower contribution rates given how the beneﬁt cuts are
phased in.8 One possible explanation for this apparent sacriﬁce is that
these workers see future political risk as related to the size of future contri-
bution rates. By reducing the burden on future generations of workers
through legislated future beneﬁt cuts (and/or prefunding through tax in-
creases, as in the United States), it might be that they hope to stem even
more draconian cuts later on.
These calculations show that governments have responded to projec-
tions of sharp increases in dependency rates by curbing future beneﬁt
promises. It is not clear, however, how much of the adjustment to the
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6. Small numbers of people were eligible for full pensions, while the contributor pools
were large. As a consequence, low tax rates could support quite generous state pensions.
7. In this paper, I concentrate on reforms to the beneﬁts rules of PAYGO systems in the
G7 countries. Other major reforms aimed at curbing future tax increases include eﬀorts to
prefund future beneﬁt obligations (Canada, Japan, and the United States) and allowing
workers to partially opt out of the state system into occupational and personal saving
schemes (the United Kingdom).
8. Net social security wealth is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the present discounted
value of expected beneﬁts and the present discounted value of expected future social security
taxes (see Feldstein 1974).projected demographic trends has already been made and what further
adjustments are still to come. A number of factors point to the likelihood
of signiﬁcant further cuts. First, even with the recent reforms, the costs of
state pension systems are still projected to rise steeply in most countries.
Second, governments have proved willing and able to curb future beneﬁt
promises when they threaten to become too costly—which is probably the
main message of this paper. And, third, proposals for additional reforms
are being formulated and debated in most countries.9
The paper is organized as follows. Section 7.1 outlines how demograph-
ics and the maturing of beneﬁt systems are creating ﬁnancial problems in
industrial country social security systems and documents that these loom-
ing strains have not signiﬁcantly reduced the generosity of beneﬁts for cur-
rent beneﬁciaries. Section 7.2 then describes the mainly forward-looking
reforms that have taken place in the 1980s and 1990s and estimates their
impact on SSW. In section 7.3, I use a simple political economy model
to help think about the puzzle of why self-interested current workers
are willing to accept large cuts in their beneﬁts while protecting the cur-
rently old. Section 7.4 concludes with some comments on how the re-
sponse to population aging of cutting PAYGO beneﬁts might aﬀect the
adequacy of retirement income in the future and on the possibility of re-
placing rather than simply reducing retirement income using a mandatory
IB system.
7.1 Demographic Trends, Pension Generosity, and Fiscal Strains
It is well known that, under current beneﬁt rules, spending on state
pensions as a share of the economy will grow dramatically as populations
age (see, e.g., OECD 1997; and Bosworth and Burtless 1998a). This will
impose a heavy burden on future workers if they are willing to meet this
higher cost, in part because of the expanded distortions brought about by
the higher required taxes. If they are not willing to meet this tax burden,
future retirees (i.e., current and future workers) are faced with the pros-
pect of having inadequate retirement incomes. One might expect that this
prospect would lead to a cut in the generosity of current beneﬁts. Such a
cut would free up tax revenues to use to prefund future beneﬁts or at least
provide a better return on the taxes that are paid (for any given future ben-
eﬁts).
Figure 7.1 shows that there has not been any signiﬁcant scaling back in
the generosity of beneﬁts during the 1980s and 1990s. The ﬁgure uses the
fact that the cost rate for state pensions (i.e., the state pension expendi-
ture-GDP ratio) can be decomposed into the product of the elderly depen-
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9. When assessing the overall risk of future beneﬁt-rule changes, we must also keep in
mind that, while we are sure that dependency rates will increase sharply over the next thirty
years, there is uncertainty about what the exact dependency rates will be.Fig. 7.1 Old-age cash beneﬁts, OECD expenditure (SOCX) and demographic
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Care must be taken in interpreting the beneﬁt rate as a measure of generos-
ity. The denominator in the average beneﬁt-expenditure calculation is the
number of elderly (deﬁned as those sixty-ﬁve and over), not the number
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Fig. 7.1 (cont.)
GOther things equal, the system will tend to become more generous if there
is a trend toward early retirement and/or if the beneﬁts paid to the retired
rise relative to income per working-age person.10
The expenditure data used in the calculations are from the OECD So-
cial Expenditure (SOCX) database and include all public old-age cash
beneﬁts. Survivor beneﬁts are not included for these calculations, although
I consider them brieﬂy below. For the United States, to take an example,
this comprehensive measure includes retirement beneﬁts paid by the social
security and the public employee retirement systems, means-tested bene-
ﬁts paid under supplemental security income (SSI), and beneﬁts paid
through a number of smaller programs.11
Over this period, the implied generosity of beneﬁts has been in a range
of 20–25 percent in Canada, Japan, and the United States, a bit more than
this in the United Kingdom, and in the higher range of 35–50 percent in
France, Germany, and Italy. The most generous beneﬁts in this sample
were recorded in Italy in 1993 at almost 50 percent. The least generous
were in Canada in 1980 at just less than 20 percent. Generosity in Canada,
France, and Italy has risen over the period (in the latter two quite sharply),
has been reasonably stable in Germany and Japan, and has fallen in the
United States. Generosity ended up higher in the United Kingdom, fol-
lowing an increase in the implied beneﬁt rate between 1988 and 1991.12
The combination of generosity and demographics led the expenditure-
GDP ratio to drift upward or remain stable in all countries. The real ac-
tion, however, is still to come as postwar baby boomers begin to retire.
Table 7.1 shows what projected increases in elderly dependency rates
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10. Gruber and Wise (1998) document a strong trend toward early retirement in the indus-
trialized economies.
11. These expenditures are only part of the state expenditures that are set to rise as popula-
tions age. Another important category of spending that is positively related to the elderly
dependency rate is medical care. Kornai and McHale (2000) present time-series and cross-
sectional evidence that the total health spending per person is positively related to the elderly
dependency rate with an elasticity of between 0.1 and 0.2. They also report regressions that
show that the share of total health spending undertaken by the public sector is positively
related to the elderly dependency rate.A1p e r c e n t a g epoint increase in the elderly depen-
dency rate is associated with roughlya3p e r c e n t a g epoint increase in the share of total
spending undertaken by the public sector, although the size of the coeﬃcient is sensitive
to speciﬁcation.
12. Given that beneﬁt generosity is usually based on a comparison of beneﬁts with wages
rather than GDP per working-age person, it is helpful for getting an intuitive sense of the
generosity involved to divide the beneﬁt rate by the labor share of GDP. The result can be
interpreted as the ratio of the beneﬁt per elderly person to the wage per working-age person.
I calculate this labor share as one minus the capital income share as reported in OECD
(1998a). For 1995, the labor shares were 0.677 for Canada, 0.589 for France, 0.637 for Ger-
many, 0.577 for Italy, 0.682 for Japan, 0.676 for the United Kingdom, and 0.638 for the
United States. The implied beneﬁt rates expressed as a percentage of wage income per
working-age person were 36.7 percent for Canada, 75.7 percent for France, 71.3 percent for
Germany, 81.8 percent for Italy, 39.4 percent for Japan, 39.3 percent for the United King-
dom, and 43.7 percent for the United States.would imply for the cost of old-age beneﬁts if 1995 beneﬁt rates were main-
tained. (Table 7.2 shows how adding in survivor beneﬁts changes these
projections.) These mechanically projected trends in this cost rate are
quite startling in some cases. At 1995 levels of generosity, old-age beneﬁts
account for close to a quarter of GDP in Germany and Italy. In France,
given somewhat less pronounced aging, these pensions still account for
Table 7.1 Total Public Expenditure on Old-Age Cash Beneﬁts Assuming Beneﬁt
Rate (average beneﬁt/GDP per working-age person) at 1995 Level—
OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX) Database (all public programs)
1995 2000 2010 2020 2030
Canada:
Dependency rate 17.7 18.2 20.4 28.4 39.1
Beneﬁt rate 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 4.3 4.5 5.0 6.9 9.6
France:
Dependency rate 23.2 23.6 24.6 32.3 39.1
Beneﬁt rate 44.6 44.6 44.6 44.6 44.6
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 10.4 10.5 11.0 14.4 17.4
Germany:
Dependency rate 22.7 23.8 30.3 35.4 49.2
Beneﬁt rate 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.4
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 10.3 10.8 13.8 16.1 22.3
Italy:
Dependency rate 23.3 26.5 31.2 37.5 48.3
Beneﬁt rate 47.2 47.2 47.2 47.2 47.2
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 11.0 12.5 14.7 17.7 22.8
Japan:
Dependency rate 20.4 24.3 33.0 43.0 44.5
Beneﬁt rate 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 5.5 6.5 8.9 11.6 12.0
United Kingdom:
Dependency rate 24.3 24.4 25.8 31.2 38.7
Beneﬁt rate 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.6
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 6.5 6.5 6.9 8.3 10.3
United States I:a
Dependency rate 19.2 19.0 20.4 27.6 36.8
Beneﬁt rate 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 5.4 5.3 5.7 7.7 10.3
United States II:b
Dependency rate 19.2 18.7 19.1 24.8 31.9
Beneﬁt rate (1995) 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 5.4 5.2 5.3 6.9 8.9
Sources: OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX) database; OECD (1997); and Bosworth and
Burtless (1998b).
Note: Expenditure-to-GDP ratio  [(dependency rate)(beneﬁt rate)]/100.
aWorld Bank demographic projections.
bSSA demographic projections.
The Risk of Social Security Beneﬁt-Rule Changes 255more than 17 percent of GDP. The shares in 2030 are considerably lower
in the remaining four countries, primarily because they start with lower
shares, although, even for these countries, there is close to a doubling of
the share of the economy devoted to state pensions. Japan is an interesting
case because the aging of its population leads the other countries but the
Table 7.2 Total Public Expenditure on Old-Age and Survivor Beneﬁts Assuming
Beneﬁt Rate (average beneﬁt/GDP per working-age person) at 1995
Level—OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX) Database (all
public programs)
1995 2000 2010 2020 2030
Canada:
Dependency rate 17.7 18.2 20.4 28.4 39.1
Beneﬁt rate 27.2 27.2 27.2 27.2 27.2
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 4.8 5.0 5.6 7.7 10.6
France:
Dependency rate 23.2 23.6 24.6 32.3 39.1
Beneﬁt rate 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 12.2 12.4 12.9 17.0 20.6
Germany:
Dependency rate 22.7 23.8 30.3 35.4 49.2
Beneﬁt rate 47.9 47.9 47.9 47.9 47.9
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 10.9 11.4 14.5 17.0 23.6
Italy:
Dependency rate 23.3 26.5 31.2 37.5 48.3
Beneﬁt rate 58.7 58.7 58.7 58.7 58.7
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 13.7 15.6 18.3 22.0 28.3
Japan:
Dependency rate 20.4 24.3 33.0 43.0 44.5
Beneﬁt rate 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 6.3 7.5 10.1 13.2 13.7
United Kingdom:
Dependency rate 24.3 24.4 25.8 31.2 38.7
Beneﬁt rate 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 7.3 7.3 7.7 9.3 11.6
United States I:a
Dependency rate 19.2 19.0 20.4 27.6 36.8
Beneﬁt rate 32.9 32.9 32.9 32.9 32.9
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 6.3 6.2 6.7 9.1 12.1
United States II:b
Dependency rate 19.2 18.7 19.1 24.8 31.9
Beneﬁt rate (1995) 32.9 32.9 32.9 32.9 32.9
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 6.3 6.2 6.3 8.2 10.5
Sources: OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX) database; OECD (1997); and Bosworth and
Burtless (1998b).
Note: Expenditure-to-GDP ratio  [(dependency rate)(beneﬁt rate)]/100.
aWorld Bank demographic projections.
bSSA demographic projections.
256 John McHaleseverity of its problem is still notably less than the large continental Euro-
pean countries by 2030.13
These mechanical projections are based on the assumption that the cost
rate rises at the same rate as the elderly dependency rate. To get a better
sense of how the cost rate has varied with the dependency rate across the
OECD over the recent past, I used a simple log-linear OLS regression us-
ing the SOCX data for a pooled sample of OECD countries for the period
1980–95. The basic regression equation is
(3) log exp
GDP















The results are reported in table 7.3, and the implied relation between the
elderly dependency rate and old-age cash beneﬁts as a share of GDP is
shown in ﬁgure 7.2. The coeﬃcient on the demographic variable is highly
signiﬁcant in the regressions without country dummies.14 The addition of
other potential determinants of generosity—GDP per capita, the share of
the population living in urban areas, and the share of women in the labor
force—has little eﬀect on the size or signiﬁcance of the demographic vari-
Table 7.3 Pooled OLS Regression for State Pension Expenditure as a Share of GDP, OECD
Countries, 1980–95
Dependent Variable  Log(Pension Expenditure/GDP)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(elderly dependency rate) 1.64 1.63 1.63 1.64 0.20
(24.94) (19.57) (19.23) (24.50) (1.98)








Constant 3.10 3.14 3.85 3.16 1.07
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.96
No. of observations 343 343 343 343 343
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses.
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13. OECD projections for Japan after 2030 indicate that the share of state pension expen-
diture continues to rise until 2050, reaching about 16 percent of GDP (OECD 1997). For
the other G7 countries, the OECD projections show a leveling oﬀ or even a fall in this share
after about 2040.
14. With country dummies, the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, but the size
of the coeﬃcient on the dependency-rate variable is much smaller.able. The regressions (without country dummies) show that a 10 percent
higher elderly dependency rate is associated with a more than 16 percent
higher expenditure-GDP ratio. This nonlinear relation might be explained
by the increased political inﬂuence of the elderly as they grow in num-
bers—an inﬂuence that is surely set to grow. However, given what this
relation implies about the future share of total income going to state retire-
ment beneﬁts, it is hard to believe that such a relation can persist. For
instance, if this relation were to hold for Italy, the share of old-age cash
beneﬁts alone would rise to 36 percent of GDP by 2030! Nonetheless, the
regression results do suggest how diﬃcult a task it will be to hold the
growth in the expenditure share below the growth in the elderly depen-
dency ratio.
The main focus so far has been on recent trends in state pension spend-
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Fig. 7.2 Aging and public pension spending, OECD countries, 1980–95
Note: Regression line: Pension Exp./GDP  0.045 (Dependency Rate)1.64. See regression (1)
in table 7.2.ing and the future implications for this spending if current levels of gener-
osity are maintained. The picture of limited reform hides the anticipated
eﬀect of already-legislated changes on future beneﬁts and thereby on fu-
ture generosity. In the next section, I attempt to estimate the eﬀect of
these reforms on social security wealth for certain stylized individuals and
households. Before doing so, it is instructive to look at the projected aggre-
gate implications of the legislated future changes. This is done in table
7.4. For each country, the ﬁrst line shows the percentage change in the
expenditure-GDP ratio for various years relative to the level of that ratio
in 1995. The second line shows the OECD projections of the percentage
change in the ratio taking into account changes to beneﬁt rules that have
already been legislated. Caution must be used in interpreting this compari-
son since the deﬁnitions of state pensions used do not coincide exactly (see
the note to the table). The basic trend is clear, however: already-legislated
Table 7.4 OECD Estimates of the Eﬀect of Legislated Reforms—Percentage Change in
Expenditure-to-GDP Ratios Relative to 1995 Ratio
% Change
2000 2010 2020 2030
Canada:
Assuming constant 1995 beneﬁt rate (from table 7.1) 2.6 14.9 60.0 120.3
OECD estimates given the eﬀect of legislated reforms 3.8 1.9 32.7 73.1
France:
Assuming constant 1995 beneﬁt rate (from table 7.1) 1.6 5.9 39.1 68.4
OECD estimates given the eﬀect of legislated reforms 7.5 8.5 9.4 27.4
Germany:
Assuming constant 1995 beneﬁt rate (from table 7.1) 10.9 41.1 64.9 129.2
OECD estimates given the eﬀect of legislated reforms 3.6 6.3 10.8 48.6
Italy:
Assuming constant 1995 beneﬁt rate (from table 7.1) 13.9 34.1 61.1 107.5
OECD estimates given the eﬀect of legislated reforms 5.3 0.8 15.0 52.6
Japan:
Assuming constant 1995 beneﬁt rate (from table 7.1) 19.2 61.9 110.9 118.3
OECD estimates given the eﬀect of legislated reforms 13.6 45.5 87.9 103.0
United Kingdom:
Assuming constant 1995 beneﬁt rate (from table 7.1) 0.3 6.1 28.3 59.1
OECD estimates given the eﬀect of legislated reforms 0.0 15.6 13.3 22.2
United States:
Assuming constant 1995 beneﬁt rate (from table 7.1) 1.2 6.1 43.5 91.4
OECD estimates given the eﬀect of legislated reforms 2.4 9.8 26.8 61.0
Source: OECD (1997); and author’s calculations.
Note: The measure of pension expenditure used in OECD (1997) for their estimates does not exactly
match the measure based on all state old-age cash expenditures from the OECD Social Expenditure
(SOCX) database used in table 7.1. Thus, the comparison of percentage changes with and without
legislated reforms should be seen as indicative only. Both sets of estimates are based on the World Bank
demographic projections.
The Risk of Social Security Beneﬁt-Rule Changes 259changes appear to have signiﬁcantly curbed the future expansion of state
pensions as a share of the economy. What are these legislated changes?
And what eﬀect do they have on the beneﬁts that people can expect to
get when they retire? I provide tenative answers to these questions in the
next section.
7.2 Recent Reforms and Their Eﬀect on Social Security Wealth
7.2.1 Assumptions
My goal in this section is to get a sense of the magnitudes of changes
to SSW that have resulted from recent reforms. Of course, a given reform
will aﬀectdiﬀerent people diﬀerently, depending on such factors as gender,
age, dependents, place in the earnings distribution, age-earnings proﬁle,
and so on.
The approach that I adopt is to look at the eﬀect on some “average”
households. Characterizing these individuals requires a number of as-
sumptions and thus should be seen only as suggestive of the eﬀect of the
reform on workers around the middle of the earnings distribution. I make
six main assumptions:
1. The worker earns the average production wage (as deﬁned by the
OECD) at age forty-ﬁve.15
2. The worker’s age-earnings proﬁle is based on that estimated by
Mincer (1974; see also Berndt 1991, chap. 5) using cross-sectional U.S.
data.16 Mincer’s cross-sectional estimate is combined with assumption 1
and data on real earnings/wage growth from the 1995 IMF International
Financial Statistics(or the 1995 World Bank World Tablesfor Italy) to pro-
duce a stylized age-earnings proﬁle.17 It is important to have some estimate
of the age-earnings proﬁle since diﬀerent countries use diﬀerent averaging
procedures in assessing relevant lifetime earnings.18
3. Expected length of retirement (assuming retirement at the standard
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15. The OECD (Tax/Beneﬁt Position of Production Workers, 1995 or earlier editions) de-
ﬁnes an average production worker (APW) as an adult full-time production worker in the
manufacturing sector whose earnings are equal to the average earnings of such workers (male
and female). The values for the wage of an APW are taken from various editions of the
OECD publication The Tax/Beneﬁt Position of Production Workers.
16. The assumed proﬁles are based on the following equation: ln earnings  k  0.081
Age  00012 Age2. To determine the value of k, the earnings of an APW and an age equal
to forty-ﬁve are substituted into the equation. Given this value of k, the proﬁle is traced out
by varying the age.
17. Real earnings growth is based on actual numbers up to 1996. From 1997 on, real
earnings are assumed to grow at a rate of 1 percent per year for all countries.
18. The limitations of this assumption are obvious enough. First, age-earnings proﬁles
diﬀer between countries, depending, in part, on such institutional features as union density
and deferred-compensation arrangements. Second, age-earnings proﬁles tend to be steeper
for high than for low lifetime earners. Indeed, the hump-shaped proﬁle that I assume tends
to be more pronounced for low-income workers.retirement age) is based on average life expectancy for workers of given
ages at the age at the time of the reform and is taken from United Nations
(1996) or OECD, (1998b).
4. The household is not entitled to any means-tested retirement bene-
ﬁts. This allows us to concentrate on universal ﬂat-rate beneﬁts and
earnings-related beneﬁts. Since I concentrate on workers earning the aver-
age production wage, this is probably realistic in most cases. Clearly, my
estimates are a poor guide to the eﬀect of reforms on low-income individu-
als, for whom means-tested beneﬁts are likely to provide a signiﬁcant por-
tion of their retirement income.
5. The worker retires at the standard retirement age and has suﬃcient
years of contributions to be eligible for full (ﬂat and earnings-related) so-
cial security beneﬁts. The worker is not aﬀected by maximum or minimum
limits for earnings-related pensions.
6. The real discount rate for discounting future beneﬁts is 3 percent.
With these assumptions, I look at the eﬀect of the reforms on the SSW
of single men and women who are forty-ﬁve at the time of the reform. For
the countries where a non-means-tested dependent spouse allowance is
available, I also note the eﬀect on a forty-ﬁve-year-old man with a depen-
dent spouse. In addition, I look at the eﬀect of the same reforms on men
and women at their respective standard retirement ages, again assuming
that these individuals earned the average production wage when aged
forty-ﬁve.
7.2.2 Stylized Beneﬁt Formulas and Their Use in SSW Calculations
Formulas for calculating retirement beneﬁts diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
country to country. Nonetheless, there are a number of common elements.
I focus on three: the standard retirement age (R); the calculation of the
beneﬁt at the time of retirement; and the postretirement indexation of
beneﬁts. Of these, the calculation of the initial beneﬁt is the least straight-
forward. Following the approach of OECD (1988), I model the calculation
of the initial beneﬁt as the sum of a ﬂat-rate (lump-sum) beneﬁt and an
earnings-related component. The benchmark beneﬁt equation at the initial
retirement age is
(4) BR B E f
a () , =+ 
where B(R) is the beneﬁt at retirement age R, Bf is the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt, 
is the replacement rate, and Ea is assessed earnings.19 Ea is some function
19. The concept of the replacement rate—i.e., the relevant earnings that are to be re-
placed—being used here is thus country speciﬁc. Since most countries under study use earn-
ings over a signiﬁcant portion of the worker’s like in the calculation of assessed earnings, the
replacement-rate concept is typically close to the fraction of lifetime earnings that are being
replaced. The signiﬁcant exception is Italy before the 1992 reform, where assessed earnings
are based only on the earnings for the ﬁve years prior to retirement.
The Risk of Social Security Beneﬁt-Rule Changes 261of the annual earnings of the various years of the individual’s working life.
There are two key elements to this calculation: ﬁrst, the years that are
included and, second, how the earnings are revalued on the basis of aver-
age earnings growth. Other things equal, the greater the weight given to
peak earning years (roughly the worker’s ﬁfties given my assumed age-
earnings proﬁle), and the more completely earnings are revalued in line
with national earnings growth (assuming that this is positive), the more
generous is the beneﬁt formula.
Once the initial beneﬁt is set, I assume that future beneﬁts can be calcu-
lated on the basis of a simple indexation rule. The beneﬁt h years into
retirement is given by
(5) BR h BR it
tR
Rh





where i(t) is the real indexation factor for year t. When beneﬁts are in-
dexed to consumer prices, the beneﬁt will be constant in real terms.20
When beneﬁts are indexed to nominal wages, the beneﬁt will rise at the
rate of real wage growth.21
My approach is to calculate gross social security wealth (SSW) for a
given beneﬁt formula viewed from a given age, T, during the worker’s life.
SSW is the present discounted value of implied future beneﬁts, evaluated
at the given point in the worker’s life. Looked at from this age, SSW is
aﬀected by changes in the retirement age, the beneﬁt formula, and the
postretirement indexation of beneﬁts (in addition, of course, to the dis-
count rate for future cash ﬂows and the expected years of retirement).
This simpliﬁed case should give us an idea of the magnitude of wealth
changes brought about by changes in the deﬁnition of beneﬁt rules.
Letting H be the duration of retirement and d the discount rate, the
equation for SSW at age T is
(6) SSW( ) ()
()










This formula calculates SSW on the basis of the simpliﬁcation that the
length of remaining life is known with certainty, where that length is set
equal to the average remaining life for someone of age T. Of course, a
person’s remaining life is rarely known with certainty. In the appendix, I
discuss how a certain life-span assumption can lead to a biased estimate
of SSW when the length of remaining life is uncertain.
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20. From the vantage point of a given age during the worker’s life, the discounted real
beneﬁt falls with the length of the individual’s retirement.
21. The real discounted beneﬁt will rise (fall) with the length of the retirement if the real
wage grows at a faster rate (slower rate) than the discount rate.7.2.3 Recent Beneﬁt-Formula Reforms in the G7 Countries
and Their Eﬀe c to nS S W
Over the last decade and a half or so, six of the seven major industri-
alized countries have signiﬁcantly redeﬁned their retirement-beneﬁt for-
mula. The exception is Canada. Among the six, the reforms that I consider
are France (1993), Germany (1992), Italy (1992), Italy (1995), Japan
(1994), the United Kingdom (1986), the United Kingdom (1994), and the
United States (1983).22 These reforms range from the relatively major
(e.g., Italy [1992, 1995] and the United Kingdom [1994]) to the relatively
minor (e.g., Japan [1993] and the United States [1983]).
The stylized beneﬁt formulas prevailing prior to the reforms and used
in the calculations are outlined in table 7.5. Table 7.6 then outlines the
reforms. It is worth noting once again that I am focusing on only a subset
of possible reforms, to wit, changes to the standard retirement age, the
initial beneﬁt formula for a worker earning the average wage with a full
contribution record, and the postretirement indexation of beneﬁts. For
example, the eﬀects of changes in eligibility conditions for a full pension,
in the maximum or minimum pension, in the generosity of and eligibility
for means-tested beneﬁts, in early retirement beneﬁts and conditions, in
accrual rates for later retirements, and so on are not included.23
As can be seen from the ﬁrst column of table 7.4, a number of countries
(Germany, Italy, Japan [tier 1 beneﬁts], the United Kingdom, and the
United States) have raised their standard retirement age, although typi-
cally with a long lead time. There has also been a tendency for a conver-
gence of the standard retirement ages for men and women (Germany, the
United Kingdom, and Italy [Dini reforms]). Thus, we will see that women
tend to lose more wealth from the reforms than identically situated men.
France, Italy (Amato reforms), and the United Kingdom have also
signiﬁcantly changed the way they assess “average earnings” for their
earnings-related pensions. In its 1986 reform, the United Kingdom also
reduced its replacement rate from 25 to 20 percent. The Dini reforms in
Italy went even further, by moving from an average-earnings-based
method for calculating beneﬁts to a contribution-based method.24 Beyond
its eﬀect on SSW, this reform has the potential of reducing labor market
distortions by strengthening the link between contributions made and
beneﬁts received, thereby making contributions seem less like a tax. This
The Risk of Social Security Beneﬁt-Rule Changes 263
22. Since the mid-1980s, a number of other OECD countries have also reformed their
deﬁned-beneﬁt retirement systems. Signiﬁcant reforms were introduced in Australia (1992),
Austria (1985, 1988, 1993), Greece (1990, 1992), Portugal (1993), and Sweden (1994).
23. The beneﬁt streams are calculated before taxes. Since the 1983 U.S. reform included a
major change in the tax treatment of beneﬁts, I also estimate the eﬀect on the stream of net
of tax beneﬁts for that reform.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.reform will have quite diﬀerent eﬀects on employees than on the self-
employed. The reason is that the self-employed faced lower contribution
rates under the old system and that the shift to a contribution-based sys-
tem will therefore hurt them more.
A number of countries have also changed the way they index beneﬁts
after retirement. France and Italy have shifted from wage indexation to
price indexation, which leads to cumulative beneﬁt cuts over time when
real wages are growing. Germany and Japan (for its tier 2 pensions) have
changed from gross wage indexation to net wage indexation. Given that
contribution rates are expected to grow over time to meet rising beneﬁt
costs, this reform is also a form of beneﬁt cut. Tax-rate projections are
diﬃcult to make, but, given that payroll-tax rates must rise substantially
(even with recent beneﬁt reforms), it is important to allow for the slower
growth of net real wages in the calculations. In Germany, the payroll tax
is projected to rise from 18.9 percent in 1995 to 27 percent in 2030.25 If we
assume that the gross real wage rises at an average annual compound rate
of 1 percent, this implies that the net real wage (assuming that nonpayroll
taxes remain constant) rises at a rate of 0.7 percent. For Japan, the contri-
bution rate is projected to rise from 16.5 percent in 1995 to 29.5 percent
in2030.26Ifweagainassume1percentrealwagegrowth(andconstantnon-
payroll taxes), this implies that the net real wage rises at the rate of 0.5
percent per year over this period.
Table 7.7 contains the estimates of the changes in the present value of
SSW for single men and women who are forty-ﬁve at the time of the re-
form and are earning the average production wage. I assume that all the
reforms are fully phased in by the (new) standard retirement age. In most
cases, this is accurate, but, in some cases, the lead times are so long that
the reforms are still a long way from being fully phased in (e.g., the Italian
and U.S. reforms). Given the previously noted diﬀerential eﬀect on em-
ployees and the self-employed of the second set of Italian reforms, I in-
clude separate estimates of the change in SSW for these two types of
worker.
The estimated losses in SSW are substantial, although, as noted above,
the range is quite large. The largest change is for men after the 1992 Italian
reforms (38 percent).27 Other big losses occurred for women in the Ger-
man, Italian, and U.K. reforms. More generally, the eﬀect on SSW tends
to be especially large when there is a change in the retirement age and
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25. Franco and Munzi (1996), based on estimates made by Germany’s Social Advisory
Board in 1994.
26. These estimates are taken from Takayama (1996).
27. Male Italian employees retiring at the standard retirement age appear to have gained
back some wealth in the 1995 reforms. On the other hand, women and the self-employed—
especially the latter—suﬀered further losses in this second round of reforms. Moreover, Ha-
mann (1997) estimates that male employees retiring before sixty-three are also net losers.Table 7.7 Eﬀect of Selected Beneﬁt Reforms on Social Security Wealth (SSW)—Forty-Five-
Year-Old Worker Earning the Average Production Wage (assuming reforms are
fully phased in by standard retirement age)
Average Prereform Postreform Change %
Production SSW SSW in SSW Change
Wage as % as % as % in
(APW) of APW of APW of APW SSW
France (1993) (francs):
Men 113,200 543 469 74 13.5
Women 113,200 680 576 104 15.3
Germany (1992)
(deutschemarks):
Men 49,904 354 328 26 7.3
Womena 49,904 596 438 158 26.2
Italy (1992) (lire):
Men 28,302,000 841 525 316 38
Women 28,302,000 1374 975 399 29
Italy (1995) (lire):b
Men (retiring at 65):
Employee 31,599,600 470 580 110 23
Self-employed 31,599,600 470 352 118 25
Women (retiring at
60):
Employee 31,599,600 791 717 74 9
Self-employed 31,599,600 791 420 371 45
Japan (1994) (yen):c
Mend 4,064,645 447 381 66 14.8
Women 4,064,645 568 495 73 12.4
United Kingdom
(1986) (pounds):
Mene 9,118 229 177 52 22.8
Womenf 9,118 469 390 79 16.9
United Kingdom
(1994) (pounds):
Meng 14,607 201 192 9 5
Women 14,607 374 265 109 29
United States (1983)
(dollars):h
Meni 18,357 163 123 40 24.6
Womenj 18,357 250 210 40 16.0
aThe postreform numbers are based on the assumption that the increase in the retirement age is fully
phased in by the time the worker retires. Since the increase in the retirement age for women (to 65 from
60) is not due to be fully phased in until 2018, these calculations overstate the eﬀect on a worker who
is 45 at the time of the reform.
bThis reform will aﬀect employees and the self-employed very diﬀerently, so the eﬀects on the SSW of
these diﬀerent types of workers are included separately. The reason for the diﬀerential eﬀects is that
the self-employed pay a much lower contribution rate than do employees. Thus, a shift to contribution-
based beneﬁts has a larger negative eﬀect on the implicit wealth of this group.
Postreform calculations are based on a real GDP growth rate of 1.5 percent.
(continued)when there is a shift from wage to price postretirement indexation.28 Given
their longer expected duration of retirement, the eﬀect of the latter reform
on women tends to be greater than the eﬀect on identically situated men.
In addition, given that the women in some cases had a lower standard
retirement age prereform, they have been disproportionately targeted for
standard-retirement-age increases in Germany and the United Kingdom.29
The German reform led to just a 7.3 percent change in SSW for men
and a 26.2 percent change for women. The corresponding numbers for
the 1994 reform in the United Kingdom are 5 and 29 percent. On the
other hand, an equal increase in the retirement age for men and women
tends to hurt men proportionately more. The reason is simply that men
have shorter life expectancies and that the lost beneﬁts therefore represent
a larger fraction of the present discounted value of the prereform beneﬁt
stream. For example, the increase in the retirement age that took place as
part of the U.S. reform reduces the SSW of men by almost one-quarter
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cThese calculations are made on the assumption that the worker retires at age 60 but after the reform
does not receive tier 1 beneﬁts until age 65. If the reform leads retirement to be postponed until age
65, then the beneﬁt losses are larger. Under this assumption, the beneﬁt losses for men and women are
34.9 and 28.7 percent, respectively.
dA married man with a dependent spouse received beneﬁts with a present value equal to 502 percent
of the wage of an APW before the reform and equal to 411 percent after the reform (an 18.1 percent
reduction in SSW).
eA married man with a dependent spouse received beneﬁts with a present value equal to 288 percent
of the wage of an APW before the reform and equal to 236 percent after the reform (an 18.2 percent
reduction in SSW).
fThe postreform numbers are based on the assumption that the increase in the retirement age is fully
phased in by the time the worker retires. Since the increase in the retirement age for women (to 65 from
60) is not due to be fully phased in until 2020, these calculations overstate the eﬀect on a worker who
is 45 at the time of the reform.
gA married man with a dependent spouse received beneﬁts with a present value equal to 267 percent
of the wage of an APW before the reform and equal to 258 percent after the reform (a 3 percent
reduction in SSW).
hThe postreform numbers are based on the assumption that the increase in the retirement age is fully
phased in by the time the worker retires. Since the increase in the retirement age to 67 is not due to be
fully phased (for a worker reaching the early retirement age of 62) until 2022, these calculations over-
state the eﬀect on a worker who is 45 at the time of the reform.
iA married man with a dependent spouse received beneﬁts with a present value equal to 224 percent
of the wage of an APW before the reform and equal to 196 percent after the reform (a 20.0 percent
reduction in SSW).
If the income of the retiree is high enough that the 50 percent of beneﬁts are now subject to income
taxation, then the loss of SSW rises to 30.2 percent.
jIf the income of the retiree is high enough that the 50 percent of beneﬁts are now subject to income
taxation, then the loss of SSW rises to 22.3 percent.
Table 7.7 (continued)
28. Both were part of the Italian reform in 1992.
29. The shift to a contribution-based system with declining coeﬃcients for earlier retire-
ments in the second Italian reform also disproportionately hurts women, given their earlier
retirement age under the older system.while reducing the SSW of women by 16 percent. These estimates are
based on average life expectancy for a forty-ﬁve-year-old in the United
States at the time of the 1983 reform, which was twenty-nine years for men
and thirty-four years for women. If retirement takes place at the standard
retirement age (sixty-ﬁve prior to the reform), these life expectancies im-
ply prereform expected retirements of nine and fourteen years for men
and women, respectively. Raising the standard retirement age to sixty-
seven and continuing to assume that retirement takes place at the standard
retirement age lower the expected retirement by two years for both men
and women. Given the relatively short expected retirement for men to
begin with, the loss of two years means a large percentage cut in the pres-
ent discounted value of beneﬁts.
Of course, retirement does not always take place at the standard retire-
ment age. Indeed, Gruber and Wise (1998) document that, in many coun-
tries, most retirements take place before the standard age, with a large
number of people leaving the labor force at the earliest possible date that
they can receive beneﬁts. For a number of countries, they also document
signiﬁcant use of disability and unemployment-beneﬁt programs to ﬁ-
nance early retirement even when state pension beneﬁts are not available.
Given this behavior, it is less clear how raising the standard retirement age
aﬀects SSW. For someone who retires before the standard retirement age
and continues to retire at the same age after the standard retirement
age has risen, we need to know how the increase in the standard retirement
age aﬀects the beneﬁts for those taking advantage of early retirement. To
take the United States as an example once again, retirement beneﬁts are
available as early as age sixty-two. Workers availing themselves of early
retirement beneﬁts, however, receive just 80 percent of the annual beneﬁt
that they would have received had they waited until age sixty-ﬁve. As we
have seen, the 1983 reform will eventually increase the standard retirement
age to sixty-seven, but a worker will still be allowed to retire at sixty-two
with permanently reduced beneﬁts. The beneﬁt penalty for early retire-
ment is now 30 percent rather than 20 percent, however. By itself, this
implies a beneﬁt cut (for men and women) of 12.5 percent. For men in
particular, this is a smaller cut than the close to 25 percent cut (which was
predominantly due to the increase in the standard retirement age) re-
ported in table 7.7. This demonstrates how the results are sensitive to the
assumption that we make about retirement behavior, and the reported esti-
mates of the eﬀects of raising standard retirement ages probably reﬂect
the upper bound of the negative eﬀects of such reforms.
The second to last column of table 7.7 also reports the change in SSW
as a fraction of the APW. This ﬁgure gives us another way of gauging the
eﬀect of the reform on the worker. For example, the ﬁrst number in the
column can be interpreted as saying that the 1993 reform of the general
regime in France reduced the present discounted value of future beneﬁts
(measured in 1993 money units) by an amount equal to 73 percent of the
The Risk of Social Security Beneﬁt-Rule Changes 271wage of a French APW in 1993. On this measure, the ﬁrst of the Italian
reforms is shown to have been especially severe, reducing SSW (if fully
phased in) by more than three times the wage of an APW for both men
and women.
Table 7.8 contains estimates of the eﬀect of the reforms on those who
retired in the year of the reform at the standard retirement age. With the
exception of changes in the form of postretirement indexing, all the re-
forms in table 7.6 above are phased in and therefore do not aﬀect the
initial beneﬁt of the newly retired. For the countries that switched from
wage to price indexation—France and Italy—the estimated loss of SSW
is between 6 and 11 percent, which is certainly not insigniﬁcant. Under
the assumptions for tax increases discussed above, the shift from gross
wage to net wage indexation—Germany and Japan—leads to cumulative
losses of about 2–3 percent.
Although the estimates of wealth changes should be seen as indicative
only, the diﬀerence between the eﬀects on middle-aged and younger work-
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Table 7.8 Eﬀect of Selected Beneﬁt Reforms on Social Security Wealth (SSW)—
Worker at Standard Retirement Age Who Earned the Average
Production Wage at Forty-Five
% Change
in SSW Reason for Change
France (1993): Wage indexation ➞ price indexation
Men 8.5
Women 10.0
Germany (1992): Gross wage indexation ➞ net wage indexation
Men 2.1 (assuming gross real wage growth of 1 per-
Women 2.8 cent and net real wage growth of 0.7 percent
[see text])
Italy (1992): Wage indexation ➞ price indexation
Men 3.4
Women 11.2
Italy (1995): No change, given the long phase-in of reforms
M e n ...
Women . . .
Japan (1994): Gross wage indexation ➞ net wage indexation
Men 2.5 (assuming gross real wage growth of 1 per-
Women 3.1 cent and net real wage growth of 0.5 percent
[see text])
United Kingdom (1986): No change, given the long phase-in of reforms
M e n ...
Women . . .
United Kingdom (1994): No change, given the long phase-in of reforms
M e n ...
Women . . .
United States (1993): 6-month cost-of-living adjustment freeze (as-
Men 1.7 suming annual inﬂation of 3.5%)
Women 1.7ers, on the one hand, and those on the retired and those close to retire-
ment, on the other, is striking. What accounts for this diﬀerence in treat-
ment? One reason is almost certainly that those who are still some distance
from retirement still have the opportunity to save for retirement and so
are in a better position to adjust to the beneﬁt cuts. Yet these adjustments
will be painful nonetheless given the magnitude of wealth loss. Putting
aside intergenerational altruism, why is it that middle-aged workers are
willing to make these adjustments instead of forcing future workers to pay
the previously promised beneﬁts? The rhetoric of reform debates suggests
that current workers fear that, with rising dependency ratios, overbur-
dened future workers will redeﬁne—or even completely eliminate—
PAYGO beneﬁt arrangements. With this in mind, the next section explores
a simple model in which self-interested current workers can actually raise
their expected beneﬁts by cutting the beneﬁts they promise themselves.
7.3 Repudiation Risk as an Inducement to Early Reform:
A Simple Model
The reform case studies produced two main ﬁndings about beneﬁt cuts:
the currently retired and those close to retirement are usually spared, and
middle-aged and younger workers can sometimes face large reductions in
their implicit gross SSW. In this section, I brieﬂy explore one explanation
for these ﬁndings with a simple model. The idea behind the model is that
workers bear a ﬁxed cost when they cut the beneﬁts of the old as well as
bearing a (nonlinear) cost to paying them beneﬁts. Beneﬁt cuts are
avoided unless beneﬁts reach a level that makes it worthwhile to incur the
ﬁxed cost. Once beneﬁts are cut, the cuts can be large. If current workers
believe that the beneﬁts that they are promising themselves will trigger
future reform, then it will be in their interests preemptively to cut their
own beneﬁts.
This model relies on the self-interest of current workers to explain why
they cut their own future beneﬁts. There are, of course, other reasons to
do so, such as a concern for the fairness of the intergenerational distribu-
tion (for a discussion of intergenerational accounting, see Kotlikoﬀ
[1992]) or a concern for economic eﬃciency (for an overview of the distor-
tions caused by PAYGO social security, see Feldstein [1996]). The costs to
current generations of reducing the unfunded liability of social security
are often seen, however, as a major obstacle to reform. Thus, the model
suggests how reforms that are considered good on more impartial grounds
might still take place even in a world with quite partial individuals.
The model has the following main elements:
1. Current workers promise themselves social security beneﬁts to be
paid for by future workers. This is an inherited unfunded liability from the
point of view of the future workers.
The Risk of Social Security Beneﬁt-Rule Changes 2732. The actual level of beneﬁts is chosen by future workers (say, because
they have a majority). This represents political risk from the point of view
of current workers. However, future workers face political (or repudiation)
costs when they redeﬁne the beneﬁts that the retired had promised them-
selves, that is, when they repudiate part of the inherited liability. I assume
that there is a ﬁxed cost to repudiation and that the cost of repudiation
rises linearly with the size of the beneﬁt reduction. We will see that this
gives current workers inﬂuence over the beneﬁts that they will receive. (I
take it that the political costs are suﬃciently high to prevent cutting the
beneﬁts of the currently retired. Attention is thus on the decision of cur-
rent workers about what beneﬁts to promise themselves.)
3. The welfare loss to future workers of funding beneﬁts rises nonlin-
early with the PAYGO tax that they must pay.
To solve the model, I ﬁrst determine the optimal choice of beneﬁt reduc-
tion by the second generation of workers for a given level of the inherited
unfunded liability. There will be some maximum level of beneﬁt that they
will choose not to repudiate at all. I show that this level is greater than the
level that they would choose if they decide to repudiate. Given that current
workers anticipate the responses of future workers (there is no uncertainty
in the model), it follows that it is optimal for them to promise themselves
beneﬁts at this “maximum” level. If the promised beneﬁts are currently
higher than this level, it is in their interest to scale them back.
For simplicity, I assume that there is a single member in the (ﬁrst) gener-
ation of current workers. Each generation lives for two periods, working
in the ﬁrst and retired in the second. The population grows at the rate n
so that there are 1 n workers in the second generation. This implies that
the dependency ratio, D, in the second period is equal to 1/(1 n).
There is a PAYGO social security system whereby the working genera-
tion is taxed and the tax revenue is paid out as a beneﬁt to the retired. For
a given actual beneﬁt payment paid to the retired, B(1), a tax of D % B(1)
is levied on each worker to ensure budget balance.
The current worker knows that a future worker will have utility given by
(7) with repudiation (i.e., 
without repudiation (i.e., 
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where T is the per worker tax, F is the total ﬁxed cost of repudiation, and
 B is the change in beneﬁts. Note that the adjustment cost (F  c B)i s
multiplied by D ( 1/[1  n]) to put it in per worker terms. Writing the
beneﬁt as the sum of the inherited unfunded liability, B(0), and the change
in that beneﬁt, the constraint faced by the future worker is
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Assuming that the future worker does repudiate, I can ﬁnd what the opti-
mal repudiation will be by substituting the budget-balancing constraint
into the utility function and maximizing with respect to  B. The optimal
change in the beneﬁt is
(9)  B c
aD
B =− () 0
so that the actual beneﬁt paid is
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The next step is to ﬁnd out when the future generation will in fact repu-
diate. I assume that repudiation will take place if it increases utility (taking
into account, of course, the costs of repudiation). The repudiation condi-
tion is then
repudiate if k c
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(which implies that future workers have higher utility by not repudiating
when the unfunded liability that they face is very low, as can be seen in
ﬁg. 7.1 above).
I now turn my attention to the current worker’s choice of unfunded
liability to place on the future worker. The current worker wants this to
be as large as possible and so chooses the largest B(0) that is consistent
with no repudiation. This can be found by replacing the inequality in the
repudiation constraint with an equality and solving the resulting quadratic
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the ﬁrst root is positive and the second negative. If I rule out negative
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That is, the beneﬁt is equal to the repudiation beneﬁt plus a premium that
is negatively related to the dependency ratio. The determination of the
maximum future beneﬁt consistent with no repudiation is shown graphi-
cally in ﬁgure 7.3.
The optimal beneﬁt increases with c and F and decreases with a and D.
Smaller repudiation costs or more distorting taxes will lower the feasible
beneﬁt for a given dependency ratio. Most important, an increase in the
future dependency ratio, D, will cause current workers to cut the beneﬁts
that they promise themselves.
Figure 7.4 shows how the actual beneﬁts paid, B(1), correspond to the
promised beneﬁts, B(0). The two rise together until the repudiation thresh-






At that level of the unfunded liability, repudiation occurs, and actual ben-
eﬁts fall to c/aD. This is a rather extreme form of debt “Laﬀer curve” (as
discussed in Krugman [1993, chap. 7]). Debt “forgiveness” in the sense
of voluntarily reducing the unfunded liability on the next generation can
actually raise the beneﬁts received, making both generations better oﬀ.
The earlier generation receives higher beneﬁts, and the latter generation
avoids the unpleasantness of cutting or redeﬁning beneﬁts for the old.
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Fig. 7.3 Determination of the maximum future beneﬁt consistent with
no repudiationWe can use the PAYGO budget constraint to see how the tax rate
changes with the dependency rate:
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Given our assumptions, current workers know that future workers will be
willing to bear part of the burden of an increase in the dependency ratio
with higher tax rates. The marginal willingness of future workers to share
the burden, however, decreases with the dependency ratio. In other words,
when the dependency ratio (and thus the tax rate) is already high, their
willingness to increase the tax rate further in response to an even higher
dependency ratio is low.
In conclusion, this simple model produces three main results that are
not inconsistent with recent reforms. First, repudiation on retirement-
beneﬁt obligations to the currently retired should not take place even when
the dependency rate is high (assuming that this high rate was anticipated).
Second, beneﬁt promises should be reformed in anticipation of the high
dependency ratio to prevent costly repudiations. And, third, an antici-
pated increase in the dependency rate should lead ultimately to a mix of
lower beneﬁts and higher taxes.
7.4 Concluding Comments
This paper has shown that, in response to projections of sharply rising
costs of state-provided retirement income, governments have succeeded in
legislating signiﬁcant cuts in future beneﬁts. In most cases, these cuts have
not been enough to stabilize the share of GDP being spent by governments
on retirement beneﬁts, so it is reasonably safe to predict more beneﬁt cuts
if this approach to “saving” social security programs continues to be pur-
sued. Although this paper has focused on attempts to scale back PAYGO
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Fig. 7.4 Relation between promised beneﬁt and actual beneﬁtprograms, I conclude with some comments on the alternatives to this ap-
proach to curbing the cost to future taxpayers.
There are two main competing approaches:30 prefund (using current
taxes) future deﬁned-beneﬁt obligations, or substitute privately prefunded
deﬁned-contribution (DC) accounts for these obligations (the IB option).
What these approaches have in common is that they force current workers
to pay for themselves what future workers were to have paid for. This is
clear with the prefunding of existing obligations but a bit obscured under
the privatization option. For the United States, where privatization has
received a lot of attention, there appear to be two approaches to moving
to an IB system. The substitution element is clearest in proposals to in-
crease the payroll tax (or use the budget surplus) to fund accounts from
which the proceeds would replace an increasing proportion of PAYGO
beneﬁts over time (see, e.g., Feldstein and Samwick 1998). The increase in
the tax is temporary as the amount needed to fund existing deﬁned-beneﬁt
(DB) obligations declines over time as these obligations are replaced by
the proceeds from the DC accounts. The alternative approach is to shift
some or all payroll taxes into the funding of private DC accounts and to
fund remaining PAYGO obligations with a combination of government
debt and increases in payroll and nonpayroll taxes (such as a consumption
tax).31 How much of the burden falls on current workers depends on the
split between tax increases and debt ﬁnance.32
What I have stressed so far is how these reforms all place a burden
on current workers partly to relieve the burden on future workers. One
important diﬀerence between the cut-future-beneﬁts and the substitute-
current-funding approaches might be their eﬀects on the adequacy of fu-
ture retirement income. It is possible that current workers will respond to
large cuts in the beneﬁts that they are promised by raising their private
saving, thereby maintaining their living standards (without having to work
longer) in later life. But it seems unwise to rely on this. In the countries
where future beneﬁts rules have already been reformed substantially, do
younger workers even know how much the beneﬁts that they should be
anticipating have fallen? The advantage of prefunding is that an alterna-
tive (albeit potentially uncertain) source of retirement income is put in
place directly.
This brings me back to where I started and the fact that there is risk in
278 John McHale
30. I ignore large-scale cuts in beneﬁts to the currently or soon to be retired as an option.
31. For a proposal of this type, see Kotlikoﬀ and Sachs (1997).
32. If current taxes are not raised at all, then future taxpayers are not being helped. Instead
of having to meet unfunded social security obligations, they will have to meet government
debt obligations. Thinking in terms of the model of sec. 7.3, however, there might be a diﬀer-
ence in the willingness to repudiate on social security obligations and the willingness to
repudiate on government debt. Thus, this form of asset swap could still beneﬁt existing
workers.both IB and PAYGO systems. Although there are diﬀerent ways to charac-
terize the risk, one aspect is the possibility of having inadequate income
in retirement. The main ﬁnding of this paper is that politically imposed
changes in PAYGO beneﬁt rules that have a large eﬀect on the ﬂow of
beneﬁts in retirement are not just a possibility—they have already oc-
curred in a number of major economies. And, given that costs are still set
to escalate substantially, it is almost certain that more are in store. The
decision about partially or fully substituting an IB for a PAYGO system
depends, of course, on more than just risk factors (notably, the eﬀects
on economic eﬃciency and inter- and intragenerational distribution). In
considering reform options, however, the vulnerability of existing PAYGO
deﬁned-beneﬁt rules must be kept in mind.
Appendix
A Note on the Bias Induced by the
Certain-Length-of-Life Assumption
How serious a limitation is the assumption of a certain remaining lifetime?
In general, the expected SSW of someone with an uncertain remaining
lifetime with an expected duration of R  T  H years is not the same as
the SSW of someone with a certain remaining lifetime of that length. The
two are equal under the following restrictive conditions: the real dis-
counted annual beneﬁt is constant over time (this requires that real bene-
ﬁts grow at a rate equal to the real discount rate), and the worker is certain
to reach retirement age.
The ﬁrst assumption implies that SSW is a linear function of the length
of retirement. If the worker is certain to reach the retirement age but the
discounted real beneﬁt falls over time so that SSW rises at a decreasing
rate with the length of retirement, then SSW will be lower under the
uncertain-lifetime assumption.33 In other words, the estimate of SSW
based on the certain-remaining-lifetime assumption is biased upward. On
the other hand, if the discounted real beneﬁt rises over time (which will
be the case if beneﬁts grow at a faster rate than the discount rate), then
the estimate is biased downward.
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33. The reasoning here is similar to that which shows that expected utility is less than
the utility of the expected income for a risk-averse individual. A risk-averse individual has
diminishing marginal utility in income. In the case considered here, the individual has dimin-
ishing marginal SSW in the number of years of retirement. Given this, and assuming that
the individual is certain to reach retirement, then the expected SSW is less than the SSW at
expected remaining length of life.A further complication is added if there is a positive probability of not
surviving until retirement age. A simple example of a linear SSW schedule
is shown in ﬁgure 7A.1. Given the constant discounted real beneﬁt, SSW
is higher under the uncertain-lifetime assumption. The worker will live to
A0 with probability p or A1 with probability 1  p, which I assume leads
her to expect to live until R  H. Note that A0 is less than R, so there is a
positive probability of not reaching retirement age. The expected SSW
given the uncertain length of life is SSWu, which is a probability-weighted
average of the zero beneﬁts that are received if the worker does not survive
until retirement and the present discounted value of beneﬁts if she survives
until A1. Inspection of the diagram reveals that this level of SSW is greater
than the SSW of someone who is certain of dying at age R  H (SSWc in
ﬁg. 7A.1).34 Thus, the possibility of dying before retirement tends to bias
the estimate of social security wealth upward. Our primary concern, how-
ever, is with the percentage change in social security wealth that results
from a beneﬁt reform rather than with the actual levels of wealth, and
there is some reason to hope that the bias is smaller for this calculation.
In the case of a linear SSW schedule, for example, a change in the level of
the (constant) discounted real beneﬁt level will lead to an equal percent-
age change in SSW under the certain- and the uncertain-lifetime assump-
tions.35
Summing up, the assumption of the ﬁxed-remaining-length-of-life as-
sumption does introduce a potential bias in estimates of SSW. It is not
obvious, however, which way the bias goes. A positive probability of not
reaching retirement leads to a downward bias, while the likelihood that
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34. It is easy to demonstrate that substituting the expected length of life, R  H  pA0 
(1  p)A1 into the equation for the dashed upward-sloping line linking the points (A0,0 )
and (A1, SSW[A1]) yields a level of SSW equal to SSWu. Thus, a graphic comparison shows
that, with a linear SSW schedule, a positive probability of early death means that expected
SSW is greater than the SSW at the expected lifetime. That is, the latter is a downwardly
biased estimate of expected SSW. Of course, if the marginal social security wealth is dimin-
ishing with the length of the retirement, it is still possible that SSW at the expected lifetime
is upwardly biased.
35. Let b be the initial discounted value of the social security beneﬁt for all periods after
retirement and b* be the beneﬁt after reform. For a retirement with a certain length of H,
the relative change in SSW is equal to the relative change in the beneﬁt, (b*  b)/b. For an
uncertain retirement of length H, and with a positive probability of dying at the preretire-







































Thus, even though making the lifetime uncertain raises the social security wealth for a given
beneﬁt level and expected life span, the relative change in wealth that results from a change
in the beneﬁt level is, under our special assumptions, the same in each case.the real beneﬁt growth rate is less than the discount rate (which is assumed
to be 3 percent for the calculations in the paper) leads to an upward bias.
Finally, if the beneﬁt growth rate and the discount rate are reasonably
close, there is reason to hope that biases in the percentage-change calcula-
tions that are the focus of the paper are less serious.
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Comment David A. Wise
A great deal of attention has been directed to the risk that individuals
would face if personal accounts were made part of the social security sys-
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David A. Wise is the John F. Stambaugh Professor of Political Economy at the John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and director of the Health and Retire-
ment Programs at the National Bureau of Economic Research.tem. In contrast, little attention has been given to the individual risk asso-
ciated with government social security programs, perhaps encouraging the
presumption that beneﬁts promised under these programs are riskless
guarantees. Even reform proposals that purport to assure the future ﬁ-
nancial solvency of the U.S. social security system by some combination
of beneﬁt cuts and tax increases, in part at least to avoid the assumed risk
of personal accounts, fail to recognize the demonstration of risk of beneﬁt
cuts. The “maintain-beneﬁts” proposal—one of three proposals put forth
by the 1994–95 Social Security Advisory Commission—is a good ex-
ample. The proposal in fact entails substantial cuts in the beneﬁts of future
retirees. The important contribution of this paper is to make clear that
promised social security beneﬁts are in fact risky “assets.”
The calculations showing that recent reform proposals in several coun-
tries will substantially reduce the beneﬁts of future retirees in these coun-
tries constitute the core of this paper. The beneﬁt reductions are measured
by the implied reductions in the present discounted value of social security
wealth (SSW). McHale also presents data showing that, while demo-
graphic trends are placing increasing pressure on the future ﬁnancial via-
bility of these social security systems, they have not yet signiﬁcantly re-
duced the beneﬁts of current retirees. Finally, McHale gives some thought
to why current workers are “willing” to accept large reductions in their
future beneﬁts while not insisting on cuts in the beneﬁts of those now in
retirement. The evidence makes it clear that beneﬁt reductions for future
retirees can be very substantial and thus that substantial risk attaches to
beneﬁt “promises.” I believe, however, that, while the evidence clearly dem-
onstrates risk, the true risk is substantially greater than the data alone
demonstrate, and I believe that McHale would agree with this assessment.
Let me begin by explaining why I believe this to be the case. I assume
that risk in this case means that realized future beneﬁts may deviate from
beneﬁts promised today. If today’s promise were guaranteed into the dis-
tant future, there would be no risk in the sense of reneging on the promise.
Why might the promise be revised? To think about this risk, I ﬁnd it useful
to distinguish between the underlying factors that induce change in the
promise, from the magnitude of the change if a change is made. It is this
latter change that McHale documents.
Many factors may induce a need to revise the promise. I emphasize a
few. One is the error in forecasting future death rates. Many prominent
demographers believe that the U.S. Social Security Administration has
consistently underestimated the continuing decline in death rates and thus
the increase in life expectancy. Realized life expectancy of successive co-
horts has consistently been greater than projections. Such errors are one
reason for the repeated optimistic assessment of the number of years until
the social security trust fund would go broke. In 1983, the projected go-
broke year was 2063; the go-broke date was more or less continuously
The Risk of Social Security Beneﬁt-Rule Changes 283brought nearer, and, by 1997, it had been brought to 2029. Projections of
life expectancy are likely to be inaccurate in the future as well. One promi-
nent demographer has told me that his guess is that a baby girl born in
the United States today has a life expectancy of one hundred. Whatever
the truth may be, there is much uncertainty about it, even among careful
analysts of demographic change. Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar
(1998) have begun to assess the risk associated with demographic uncer-
tainty (fertility and mortality) as well as productivity growth and interest
rates. On the basis of their stochastic forecast analysis, they judge that the
trust fund could go broke much sooner, or substantially later, than the
Social Security Administration projects in either of its three scenarios.
Their 95 percent conﬁdence interval includes fund exhaustion in 2014 as
well as 2037.
A second factor is incentive eﬀects (or behavioral response). While
economists make a living on incentive eﬀects, they are often ignored or
unrecognized by many participants in the political decision-making pro-
cess. In particular, the provisions of the social security systems in many
countries place enormous implicit taxes on work after certain ages. Such
provisions seem to have been associated with striking declines in the labor
force participation of older workers in several of the countries in McHale’s
analysis. The decline as well as the striking relation between plan provi-
sions and the proportion of older workers in the labor force is documented
by Gruber and Wise (1999). Retirement at younger and younger ages ex-
acerbates the ﬁnancial pressure on social security systems caused by dem-
ographic trends.
A third factor is calculation “error.” For example, errors in the formula
that was to index beneﬁts to inﬂation in the 1972 U.S. social security legis-
lation (perhaps actually realized before the legislation was implemented)
caused enormous “unintended” increases in beneﬁts over a seven-year pe-
riod before they were corrected. This of course has important implications
for the future ﬁnancial viability of the system. Errors that inﬂate beneﬁts
in one year are likely to mean a reduction in beneﬁts in future years. (As
with ﬁnancial market risk, there is upside as well as downside risk. Those
who beneﬁted from the error were lucky; those who later have to pay for
it are unlucky.)
A fourth factor is inaction once ﬁnancial imbalance is recognized. Inac-
tion is likely to increase required adjustments. For example, without indi-
vidual accounts, social security reform proposals in the United States typ-
ically entail beneﬁt reductions of perhaps 25–35 percent if the issue is
addressed now. If nothing is done for many years, as some would prefer,
the required adjustment would likely be much greater. Indeed, the ﬁnan-
cial imbalance is much greater in Germany, for example, than in the
United States, partly because population aging occurred earlier in Ger-
many than in the United States and no action was taken for some time.
284 John McHaleNow, the adjustments needed to balance the system are much greater than
those that have been adopted to date (and analyzed by McHale).
McHale has very clearly demonstrated that changes that are made can
imply large beneﬁt reductions. I have tried to emphasize that the true risk
is likely to be much greater than the reductions in beneﬁts that he calcu-
lates. McHale of course recognizes this in saying that further reductions
are likely to be in store in many of the countries he analyzes.
Looking at the data in a way somewhat diﬀerent from the data pre-
sented in the McHale paper seems to me to reinforce this judgment. Mc-
Hale presents data on the “beneﬁt rate” deﬁned by the average beneﬁt per
person sixty-ﬁve and older relative to GDP per person ﬁfteen to sixty-
four. More standard replacement rates—deﬁned by the beneﬁt as a per-
centage of ﬁnal earnings—are shown in table 7C.1, together with addi-
tional data on plan characteristics (see Gruber and Wise 1999). Countries
analyzed by McHale are noted. For a person with median lifetime earn-
ings, the replacement rates at the early retirement age range from a high
of 91 percent in France and the Netherlands to a low of 20 percent in
Canada. The U.S. replacement rate is 41 percent. The replacement rates
shown in the table are based on simulations using precise plan provisions
in each country prior to proposed reforms. In some cases, these replace-
ment rates diﬀer substantially from those reported by McHale in his table
7.5, and I return to possible reasons for that below. I present the replace-
ment rates here to suggest that to bring the plans in many countries into
ﬁnancial balance would require beneﬁt reductions much greater than
those reﬂected in proposed plan changes reported and analyzed by
McHale in tables 7.5–7.8.
To bring the U.S. system into “balance” as indicated by non-individual
account reform proposals would require beneﬁt reductions of perhaps
25–35 percent. The U.S. change analyzed by McHale suggests a SSW re-
duction of about 25 percent for men and 16 percent for women. Surely,
the reductions required to bring the German, French, and Italian plans,
for example, into ﬁnancial balance are much greater than the SSW reduc-
tions reported in McHale’s table 7.7, which are implied by the proposed
changes.
Finally, without disparaging the eﬀort and important calculations made
by McHale, let me mention several reasons why these calculations may
represent only a ﬁrst step in this kind of analysis, as McHale emphasizes.
First, the calculations are based on a “stylized” beneﬁt formula (based on
an OECD approach), which may measure the eﬀect of current and pro-
posed plans with substantial error. The diﬀerence in the replacement rates
reported in table 7C.1 (and based on actual detailed plan provisions) and
the rates reported in McHale’s table 7.5 may indicate the magnitude of
potential diﬀerences. Second, McHale’s calculations reﬂect in large part
proposed changes in plan normal retirement ages, although he does give
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and even in the United States, only a small fraction of persons work until
the normal retirement age, as shown in Gruber and Wise (1999). Much
more important in reducing plan costs would be increases in the early
retirement age. Third, in many European countries, disability and unem-
Table 7C.1 Labor Force Participation and Key Plan Features, by Country
Men Men “Tax
Not out of Implicit Force”
Working Labor Early Replacement Tax on to
Age Force Retirement Rate at Earnings Retire,
55–65 Age 59 (ER) ER Age in Next ER Age
Country (%) (%) Age (%) Year (%) to 69
Belgium 67 58 “60” 77 82 8.87
Francea 60 53 60 91 80 7.25
Italya 59 53 “55” 75 81 9.20
Netherlands 58 47 “60” 91 141 8.32
United
Kingdoma 55 38 60 48 75 3.77
Germanya 48 34 60 62 35 3.45
Spain 47 36 60 63 23 2.49
Canadaa 45 37 60 20 8 2.37
United
Statesa 37 26 62 41 1 1.57
Sweden 35 26 60 54 28 2.18
Japana 22 13 60 54 47 1.65
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999).
Note: The second to last column in the table measures the implicit tax on earnings if a person works
for an additional year following the early retirement age. The last column shows the sum of implicit
tax rate from the early retirement age through age 69. Both measures are explained in Gruber and Wise
(1999). In some countries, the eﬀective early retirement age is ambiguous. The quotation marks are
intended to signal cases where the ambiguity is perhaps the greatest, but the availability of unemploy-
ment and disability beneﬁts creates ambiguities in other cases as well. The calculations presented in
this table are taken from the individual country papers and pertain to these cases:
Belgium: The social security early retirement age is 60, but employees who are laid oﬀ are eligible
for large beneﬁts at younger ages. Thus, the accrual, implicit tax, and tax-force measures treat unem-
ployment beneﬁts as early retirement beneﬁts available at 55.
France: Counting social security beneﬁts, available at age 60, but not accounting for guaranteed
income beneﬁts for those losing their jobs at age 57 or older.
Italy: Social security beneﬁts for private-sector employees, not counting disability availability.
Netherlands: In addition to public social security beneﬁts, the calculations account for virtually
universal employer private pension beneﬁts. The employer plan is assumed to provide for early retire-
ment at age 60. There is no social security early retirement in the Netherlands, but employer early
retirement beneﬁts are commonly available at age 60.
United Kingdom: Based on social security beneﬁts only, but counting “incapacity” beneﬁts at 60 as
early retirement beneﬁts.
Germany: Counting social security beneﬁts and assuming a person is eligible for “early” disability
beneﬁts.
Spain: Based on RGSS (the main social security program).
aCountries analyzed by McHale.
286 John McHaleployment insurance programs essentially serve as early retirement pro-
grams, which in many cases provide early retirement several years before
the nominal social security early retirement age. The provisions of these
programs would also have to be changed to bring the overall elderly sup-
port programs into balance.
In short, McHale has demonstrated that plan changes can have a large
eﬀect on previously “promised” social security beneﬁts. I commend the
eﬀort to make such calculations. I believe that the true risk inherent in
these programs is in fact much greater than that indicated by the calcula-
tion made in the paper.
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Discussion Summary
David Wilcox noted the importance of understanding the reasons for the
deterioration of the solvency projections since 1983. Changes in demo-
graphic assumptions have actually mirrored the balance and thus are not
part of the reason for this evolution. Better explanations implicate initial
productivity forecasts that were too optimistic and changes in the method-
ology used by the actuary, which tended to deteriorate the solvency projec-
tions on average. A third reason is that the projections cover only a ﬁnite
(seventy-ﬁve-year) period. Given that the system is projected to be experi-
encing deep cash-ﬂow deﬁcits in the long term, the incorporation of a new
seventy-ﬁfth year into the projection period each year worsens the balance
by about 0.08 percent of taxable payroll.
Andrew Samwick stated that he liked the paper very much and wondered
what the size of beneﬁt changes has been even outside the current context,
that is, throughout the history of the social security system. In particular,
he referred to the increases in beneﬁts that occurred during the 1970s in
both the United States and the United Kingdom. Incorporating this into
the analysis might weaken some of the results in terms of how much cur-
rent retirees or agents close to retirement are hurt by the more recent
downward adjustments of the beneﬁt entitlements.
Zvi Bodie noted that, in order to draw welfare implications from this
The Risk of Social Security Beneﬁt-Rule Changes 287analysis, one should focus, not on the number of elderly as a fraction of
the working-age population, but rather on the number of elderly in need
as a fraction of the total population. Bodie expressed the opinion that
many elderly choose not to retire as long as they are healthy. Therefore,
the proportion of elderly per se is not a relevant concept for public policy
issues. Instead, what warrants the attention of policymakers is the fact
that one cares about the elderly who are needy and incapable of earning
income. The dependency ratios typically analyzed do not reﬂect this. Bo-
die concluded that, in his opinion, the crisis was overstated because what
underlies the decrease in mortality rates is the fact that the elderly are
healthier and are therefore able to work longer.
John Shoven remarked with respect to this comment that numerous lob-
bies actively seek to lower, not raise, the retirement age.
Henning Bohn liked the paper generally but expressed concern about
the measure of government spending used in the empirical part of the
paper. First, he noted that the real challenge facing us is medical spending,
not cash beneﬁts. If one limits attention to social security cash beneﬁts,
then the perspective is deﬁnitely too narrow. Second, government cash
spending seems to include spending on government-employee pensions.
Bohn remarked that this potentially biases the cross-country analysis as
countries diﬀer substantially in the size of their public sector. The numbers
for cash spending in countries with a large public workforce are therefore
inﬂated artiﬁcially, independent of the social burden of the elderly that the
country has to support.
James Poterba remarked that the generosity of beneﬁt rules tends to
revert to the mean over time, thereby dampening its volatility over longer
horizons. In particular, he noted that, in many countries, beneﬁts in-
creased in the 1970s and 1980s (especially when including the programs
that David Wise, the discussant, identiﬁed as important, e.g., disability),
whereas, more recently, some trimming of the sails was seen in the form
of beneﬁt reductions. Someone who entered the labor force in 1970 re-
ceived an unexpected windfall in beneﬁts entitlements in the 1980s and
subsequently witnessed reductions in expected beneﬁts in the 1990s. Thus,
the risk over a long period could be less than the risk over a shorter ho-
rizon.
Martin Feldstein made the following comments. Concerning David Wil-
cox’s question about the reasons for the deterioration over the course of
the 1980s and 1990s of the solvency projections, he added that early retire-
ment was a likely cause. He agreed furthermore with Bohn’s remark about
the importance of Medicare, especially for the future, not so much for the
current situation. Finally, he expressed the view that Bodie’s opinion on
the preference for late rather than early retirement was based on introspec-
tion and is most likely not representative of the entire population.
288 John McHaleRichard Zeckhauser wondered about the timing of the incentive eﬀects
in the context of the diagrams shown by the discussant, David Wise, illus-
trating the dramatic decline in labor force participation by medium-old
people. He asked whether it was not the case that the incentive eﬀects
were created before the changes in the generosity of pension beneﬁts. With
respect to the dangers of introspection in the context of the preference for
early or late retirement, as noted by Feldstein, he referred to popular rhet-
oric in Europe. The rhetoric claims that the elderly should retire early in
order to allow the young to ﬁnd a job, given the high rates of unemploy-
ment.
Zeckhauser furthermore suggested that McHale consider alternative
political economy explanations for why the young are willing to accept
beneﬁt reforms that are not favorable to them. A ﬁrst alternative theory,
most relevant to the United States, stresses the fact that the elderly are
politically much better organized than the young, simply by virtue of be-
ing one-issue voters. A second explanation revolves around the (relatively
short) horizon of the political decision-making process. Finally, Zeck-
hauserpointedoutthatsocialsecuritycloselyresemblesacontingentclaim,
where the beneﬁts received are dependent on a particular contingency.
This description is more appropriate than the term risky social security.
The discussant, David Wise, disagreed with Zeckhauser’s ﬁrst comment.
Cross-country evidence convincingly shows a tight relation between im-
plicit taxes on working and the proportion of people working between the
ages of ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-ﬁve. The incentive eﬀects seem to be quite
strong and very relevant for early retirement and the drop in labor force
participation.
David Cutler noted that the analysis ignores survivors’ beneﬁts. They
are nevertheless important.
John McHale agreed with Wilcox’s criticism of the use of point distribu-
tions and stated that the direction of the bias would be examined. He
also noted that the suggestions of Samwick and Poterba to analyze earlier
periods of beneﬁt increases would be enlightening. Finally, he remarked
that some social security reforms move in the direction mentioned by
Zeckhauser. Indeed, both Italy and Germany seem to be evolving toward
a system with more explicit contingency-based beneﬁts.
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